Want another bull market? To be straightforward, we don't need dazzling buzz words. What we need is a new distribution mechanism, trading mechanism and market-making mechanism, so as to bring stupid money, so where to find potential new distribution mechanisms?
Low liquidity asset market From the lessons of Shuizang, BRC20, Friend, NFT, casino model and @blur_io, let's find the recipe for new issuance mechanism and market
1/ The Crypto audience is the most knowledgeable and gambler in the world. Their good bets are different from classic "casino gamblers", because they - don't need fixed odds - believe in information difference advantage rather than long-trained skills (out of thousands) or the law of large numbers so they don't like snail shells Dojo in the dojo, repeatedly studying how to beat the 0.5% house edge of blackjack dealers; but looking for the hidden alpha in the new target, and exit before the market understands
2/ They need targets that are not widely known, so traditional markets and mainstream currencies do not meet the requirements, and the cost of seeking "new" is a low-liquidity, high-risk target market: 1. High transaction efficiency (whether it can be quickly traded ) 2. High volatility (small trading volume leads to large fluctuations and rapid rise) 3. The advantages of non-trading mechanisms are minimized (you can gamble and lose but not be rugged) This kind of target is in line with their early discovery, precise exit, and exit need
3/ Similarly, the banker will choose between three dimensions, but the purpose is to maximize the comprehensive profit ROI, no matter in what way: - fairness (whether there is a non-trading advantage) - transaction efficiency (whether both parties Can be traded quickly) - Volatility (whether it can be traded at a low cost) Unless you are a philanthropist,** these three dimensions are an impossible triangle from the perspective of a banker. **The bookmaker will consider how to balance player orientation and maximize ROI when designing
4/ Whether it is the electronic disk of the postal currency card in the early days, or the AMM mechanism of Shuizang and meme coins, the NFT pending order transaction, even the BRC20/ETHS fair inscription pending order, and the Friend curve, it is essentially the same thing. ** Different ratios, but to attract users, you need to have: - Wealth effect (exponential ROI of flagship projects) - Sufficient target (latecomers have more projects to rush) - Somatosensory customer loss is controllable, like GGR kill rate Model?
5/ Let's compare the non-free mint PFP NFT, BRC-20 and Shuizang BRC-20 from the point of view of the banker, which is the least economical: the banker has no advantage, and the transaction efficiency of the pending order mode is low. It takes too much money, but the premise is that the banker gets the full inscription NFT≈BRC-20. The project party has a greater advantage, and can reserve a complete black box for smashing the plate and rug counting. There is almost no open market available, basically Zhuang idle opponent game
6/ If it is substituted into the GGR kill rate model, we find that: **Shu Zang kill rate is the most controllable, followed by NFT, and BRC-20 is completely uncontrollable. ** What would you do if you were Zhuang? This is why the height of iBox is difficult to match in the NFT market so far. Similarly, the BRC20 project has no successors and its life cycle is much shorter than that of NFT. It is not surprising regardless of cultural attributes. "Fairness" can bring about a temporary popularity and wealth effect, but in the end it is the operator's needs that determine everything
7/ Then compare @Friendtech, Shuizang and NFT?
We will find that FT is more cruel, because the user's opponent is always the platform, and the automatic market-making algorithm is used for transactions. The algorithm is positively related to the number of net purchases, and the only cost is 5% for KOL.
** For the same pull, FT actually needs to pay 5% of the current price, while NFT needs to pay 100% of the floor price of the market circulation in full. **
8/ Even in the price drop range, if support is needed, then FT is still equivalent to continuous LBP issuance, while NFT can only continue to hard sell with sales revenue + royalties
Imagine that FriendTech has not announced a referendum plan. Is it possible to only reward buying and punish selling?
Having said that, I have to mention what is wrong with another plate @blur_io made by Paradigm. It is obviously also a transaction mining code washing model
9/ **The problem is that Blur's subsidy is going to the wrong people. **Blur let its users go to the gaming table to do bid wall and provide liquidity to whom? To the holder of the blue chip NFT. The holder is dumped on the user, resulting in losses. Who took this customer loss? It is a holder. Blur got nothing. Instead, airdrops will be sent to users based on the trading volume. This is like a gambler who gets 1.2% for washing his code, and loses 80% of the bet for the code. And the casino didn't make a dime
10/ **What is the correct way to do it? **Blur only allows its own NFT target to participate in transaction mining, and bid wall as counterparty, customer loss becomes Blur's GGR, uses part of the pull, and at the same time uses transaction mining to subsidize user buying behavior, and eventually kills the rate Control within a certain range. In the next step, continue to absorb excellent NFT teams, join transaction mining under the premise of using Blur as a market maker, become Curve of NFT, and even rule NFT
11/ In fact, seeing this, I believe the answer is already coming out: - Find a target with (actual) low fairness, high volatility, and as high transaction efficiency as possible - Establish a trading platform with a transaction mining subsidy mechanism - Through the transaction mining mechanism Subsidize the purchase behavior, subsidize the target of full control of the bid - ensure that the total customer loss is slightly higher than the total subsidy (including the cost of pulling the bid) - pack the mining mechanism with the market-making terms, and expand the screening area of the project party to do live bids
12/ Of course, I only substituted the POV of Paradigm from the perspective of the dealer. However, in fact, most of us are separated from Paradigm by 10,000 @Delphi_Digital (the ability to mobilize the big V on the whole network is not something that can be learned)
It is difficult to say how the market responds, whether the right time, place and people are in place. But with the Ordinal jewels ahead, the Bot line came from behind, Why Not?
There must be the next (group) hero on the chain, IT COULD BE YOU
Communication group (note company and position)
7UPDAO
Disclaimer: Readers are requested to strictly abide by local laws and regulations. This article does not represent any investment advice.
Original link:
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The content is for reference only, not a solicitation or offer. No investment, tax, or legal advice provided. See Disclaimer for more risks disclosure.
Understand the three-dimensional trade-offs of fairness, transaction efficiency, and volatility from the perspective of being a banker
Author: Crypto Skanda Twitter: @thecryptoskanda
Want another bull market? To be straightforward, we don't need dazzling buzz words. What we need is a new distribution mechanism, trading mechanism and market-making mechanism, so as to bring stupid money, so where to find potential new distribution mechanisms?
Low liquidity asset market From the lessons of Shuizang, BRC20, Friend, NFT, casino model and @blur_io, let's find the recipe for new issuance mechanism and market
1/ The Crypto audience is the most knowledgeable and gambler in the world. Their good bets are different from classic "casino gamblers", because they - don't need fixed odds - believe in information difference advantage rather than long-trained skills (out of thousands) or the law of large numbers so they don't like snail shells Dojo in the dojo, repeatedly studying how to beat the 0.5% house edge of blackjack dealers; but looking for the hidden alpha in the new target, and exit before the market understands
2/ They need targets that are not widely known, so traditional markets and mainstream currencies do not meet the requirements, and the cost of seeking "new" is a low-liquidity, high-risk target market: 1. High transaction efficiency (whether it can be quickly traded ) 2. High volatility (small trading volume leads to large fluctuations and rapid rise) 3. The advantages of non-trading mechanisms are minimized (you can gamble and lose but not be rugged) This kind of target is in line with their early discovery, precise exit, and exit need
3/ Similarly, the banker will choose between three dimensions, but the purpose is to maximize the comprehensive profit ROI, no matter in what way: - fairness (whether there is a non-trading advantage) - transaction efficiency (whether both parties Can be traded quickly) - Volatility (whether it can be traded at a low cost) Unless you are a philanthropist,** these three dimensions are an impossible triangle from the perspective of a banker. **The bookmaker will consider how to balance player orientation and maximize ROI when designing
4/ Whether it is the electronic disk of the postal currency card in the early days, or the AMM mechanism of Shuizang and meme coins, the NFT pending order transaction, even the BRC20/ETHS fair inscription pending order, and the Friend curve, it is essentially the same thing. ** Different ratios, but to attract users, you need to have: - Wealth effect (exponential ROI of flagship projects) - Sufficient target (latecomers have more projects to rush) - Somatosensory customer loss is controllable, like GGR kill rate Model?
5/ Let's compare the non-free mint PFP NFT, BRC-20 and Shuizang BRC-20 from the point of view of the banker, which is the least economical: the banker has no advantage, and the transaction efficiency of the pending order mode is low. It takes too much money, but the premise is that the banker gets the full inscription NFT≈BRC-20. The project party has a greater advantage, and can reserve a complete black box for smashing the plate and rug counting. There is almost no open market available, basically Zhuang idle opponent game
6/ If it is substituted into the GGR kill rate model, we find that: **Shu Zang kill rate is the most controllable, followed by NFT, and BRC-20 is completely uncontrollable. ** What would you do if you were Zhuang? This is why the height of iBox is difficult to match in the NFT market so far. Similarly, the BRC20 project has no successors and its life cycle is much shorter than that of NFT. It is not surprising regardless of cultural attributes. "Fairness" can bring about a temporary popularity and wealth effect, but in the end it is the operator's needs that determine everything
7/ Then compare @Friendtech, Shuizang and NFT?
We will find that FT is more cruel, because the user's opponent is always the platform, and the automatic market-making algorithm is used for transactions. The algorithm is positively related to the number of net purchases, and the only cost is 5% for KOL.
** For the same pull, FT actually needs to pay 5% of the current price, while NFT needs to pay 100% of the floor price of the market circulation in full. **
8/ Even in the price drop range, if support is needed, then FT is still equivalent to continuous LBP issuance, while NFT can only continue to hard sell with sales revenue + royalties
Imagine that FriendTech has not announced a referendum plan. Is it possible to only reward buying and punish selling?
Having said that, I have to mention what is wrong with another plate @blur_io made by Paradigm. It is obviously also a transaction mining code washing model
9/ **The problem is that Blur's subsidy is going to the wrong people. **Blur let its users go to the gaming table to do bid wall and provide liquidity to whom? To the holder of the blue chip NFT. The holder is dumped on the user, resulting in losses. Who took this customer loss? It is a holder. Blur got nothing. Instead, airdrops will be sent to users based on the trading volume. This is like a gambler who gets 1.2% for washing his code, and loses 80% of the bet for the code. And the casino didn't make a dime
10/ **What is the correct way to do it? **Blur only allows its own NFT target to participate in transaction mining, and bid wall as counterparty, customer loss becomes Blur's GGR, uses part of the pull, and at the same time uses transaction mining to subsidize user buying behavior, and eventually kills the rate Control within a certain range. In the next step, continue to absorb excellent NFT teams, join transaction mining under the premise of using Blur as a market maker, become Curve of NFT, and even rule NFT
11/ In fact, seeing this, I believe the answer is already coming out: - Find a target with (actual) low fairness, high volatility, and as high transaction efficiency as possible - Establish a trading platform with a transaction mining subsidy mechanism - Through the transaction mining mechanism Subsidize the purchase behavior, subsidize the target of full control of the bid - ensure that the total customer loss is slightly higher than the total subsidy (including the cost of pulling the bid) - pack the mining mechanism with the market-making terms, and expand the screening area of the project party to do live bids
12/ Of course, I only substituted the POV of Paradigm from the perspective of the dealer. However, in fact, most of us are separated from Paradigm by 10,000 @Delphi_Digital (the ability to mobilize the big V on the whole network is not something that can be learned)
It is difficult to say how the market responds, whether the right time, place and people are in place. But with the Ordinal jewels ahead, the Bot line came from behind, Why Not?
There must be the next (group) hero on the chain, IT COULD BE YOU
Communication group (note company and position)
7UPDAO
Disclaimer: Readers are requested to strictly abide by local laws and regulations. This article does not represent any investment advice.
Original link: